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This paper investigates the impact of inflation targeting (IT) on inflation and economic growth 
among emerging countries, controlling for common time-variation, country-specific effects and 
simultaneity. The inclusion of a common time effect weakens the IT negative relation with 
average inflation, and considerably obviates its damping down effect on the volatilities of 
inflation and output growth, previously found in the literature. To observe the IT regime’s 
endogeneity helps to recover some of its lowering effect on inflation, but not on the volatilities. 
More important, the analysis of average output growth shows robust evidence of a negative 
significant IT impact, making it clear that there is a welfare cost of IT disinflation. 
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  Recent works like Gonçalves and Salles (2008), Batini and Laxton (2007) and 
IMF (2006) have brought optimistic evidence about the good performance of inflation 
targeting (IT) regimes in developing countries, in spite of the concerns by Bernanke and 
Woodford (2005), Mishkin (2000, 2004), Sims (2005) among others about their 
institutional maturity and consistency of macroeconomic fundamentals. When compared 
to the less conclusive evidence of Ball and Sheridan (2005) for developed economies, 
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  1which better fulfill the attributes believed necessary for an efficient IT policy, those 
findings are striking. 
  Gonçalves and Salles (2008), denominated GS hereafter, apply Ball and Sheridan 
(2005) cross-section difference-in-difference OLS approach to test if the adoption of IT 
impacts on the inflation and economic growth of 36 emerging economies. They show that 
IT countries lowered the average inflation rates and the real output growth volatility 
relatively more than non-IT countries. With this evidence, but without analyzing the IT 
effect on the average output growth, they conclude (on page 318) that “… the often heard 
claim that Inflation Targeting regimes hinder economic growth is clearly not sustained by 
the empirical evidence. In sum, data so far suggests that the adoption of IT by emerging 
economies did contribute towards the attainment of superior outcomes in terms of 
economic performance”. 
  Applying the same methodology, Batini and Laxton (2007), BL hereafter, are 
even more positive about IT performance, showing not only that IT adoption reduces the 
average inflation and the volatility of the real output growth, but also the volatility of 
inflation. Like GS, BL don’t rigorously study the rate of output growth, but their 
volatility.
 1 Based on those, they state (on page 13) that: “Thus there is no evidence that 
inflation targeters meet their inflation objectives at the expense of real output 
stabilization.” 
  The above works have in common two flaws. First, related to the econometrics, 
Ball and Sheridan’s (2005) cross-section difference-in-difference ordinary least square 
approach might not be sharp enough to evaluate the IT policy efficiency, as Gertler 
(2005) has warned. The adoption of IT is an endogenous choice, taken at different times 
and by countries with different unobservable characteristics, while the above approach 
does not account for the potential bias induced by endogeneity, nor control for time and 
country fixed-effects. Second and most important, as a mater of assessment, to miss the 
analysis of the levels of output growth seriously vitiates the conclusion that IT does not 
hinder economic growth, given there is an expected negative relation between inflation 
and economic activity implied by the Phillips curve. 
                                                 
1 Batini and Laxton (2007) just present plots of average output growth against output growth volatility 
(their Figure 2) for pre and pos IT adoption and simply say (on page 9) that “… For real output growth … 
the pattern is less clear … with little change in average growth.” 
  2  This paper revisits GS and BL emerging economies sample data using a 
methodology that tries to isolate the improve in performance exclusive due to the IT 
adoption from other sources not controlled for by the Ball and Sheridan (2005) approach, 
like common time-varying effect, country fixed-effects and endogeneity. Instead of 
averaging the time series observations in a pre and post periods and working with a cross-
section, we exploit the time and country-specific dimensions. Similar to Beck and Levine 
(2004), the data is summarized over many three-year periods, which seems a sensible 
compromise between separating IT effects from other close events’ effects and giving 
enough time for the sluggish responses of macro variables. Econometrically, we apply the 
two-step System GMM panel estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) that controls for simultaneity and omitted variable biases. The 
preference for System GMM to Difference GMM by Arellano and Bond (1991) is because 
the former is better instrumented to capture the effects of highly persistent variables than 
the latter, what is particularly useful in the case of the IT regime variable. While these 
estimation approaches are suited for micro data, where the number of time periods (T) is 
small relative to the number of individuals (N), in macro it might be problematic as the 
number of instruments (a function of  T ) climbs toward the number of countries (N) in 
small samples. When instruments are many, they tend to over-fit the instrumented 
variables and bias the results. In this context, our strategy of summing data up over three-
year periods is helpful as far as it allows inputting the information contained in longer 
time series while holding the number of instruments back. Yet to avoid the over-fitting 
problem, we also reduce the dimensionality of the instrument matrix by collapsing its 
columns as in Calderon et al. (2002). Finally, for accurate inference purposes, our two-
step standard errors are corrected for finite sample as suggested by Windmeijer (2005). 
  Besides the GMM panel estimators just described, we present estimates for simple 
pooled cross-section OLS, pooled OLS including common time-variable effect and 
including time and country-effects, that better help to understand how the results change 
as more flexibility is added to the Ball and Sheridan (2005) approach. 
  Focusing on a panel sample of 46 developing countries during twenty seven 
years, between 1980 and 2006, we review GS and BL results on average inflation, 
inflation volatility, output growth volatility and, more revealing, add some new evidence 
  3on average real output growth. Sensitivity to differences in the time period, the date of IT 
adoption according to different authors, and the non-IT control group are also addressed. 
  Overall, the inclusion of a common time-effect variation weakens the cross-
country negative relations of the IT regime with average inflation, and different measures 
of volatility, and makes the negative relation between IT and real output growth much 
stronger. After controlling for the omitted variables bias and the dynamic panel bias, the 
IT relation with inflation is negative, but its significance is impaired by its positive 
correlation with the inflation error. When treated as endogenous, IT coefficient becomes 
more negative and significant, as expected, but its significance is not robust to the non-IT 
control group. 
  One novel evidence in this paper is that, after controlling for time-effects, 
country-effects and endogeneities, the IT adoption has a negative significant impact on 
the average real output growth in emerging countries. We also add that the negative 
growth-IT relation shows quite stable estimates and seems more robust than the inflation-
IT relation. Thus, the evidence on economic growth reduction is relatively stronger than 
evidence on inflation reduction, clarifying that the IT regimes do seem to hinder 
economic growth. In case one accepts that IT has been effective in reducing inflation, 
data so far even strongly suggests that it has a cost in term of lower output growth. 
  We also show that when measured by the standard-deviation, the volatility of 
inflation is negatively impacted by the IT regime, but the effect is small and not 
convincingly significant. When the standard-deviation dependence on levels is taken into 
account, and the coefficient of variation is used as the volatility measure instead, neither 
inflation nor growth volatility is reduced by the IT framework. 
The article is organized as follows. The methodology applied is described in 
section 2. Section 3 summarizes the data used. The empirical results are reported and 





We work with a partial adjustment model: 
  4 
t n n t t n
IT
t n t n t n X d y y , , , 1 , , υ η δ γ β α + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = − ,       ( 1 )  
 
where:    is some macroeconomic performance indicator; subscript  n = 1, 2, …, N  is 
for country and  t = 1, 2, …, T  is for date. The lagged value     on the right-hand side 
is included to capture persistence and mean-reverting dynamics, but reduces the 
dependent variable sample to  (T-1)  observations as consequence. Among the vector of 
independent variables  
t n y ,
1 , − t n y
( ) t n
IT
t n t n t n X d y w , , 1 , , , , − =
t n X ,
t
 , our focus is going to be on the IT 
dummy variable    , equal to  1  if country  n  is a inflation targeter in period  t  and  0  
if it is not. The vector    , with possibly endogenous regressors, accounts for other 
covariates. The term  
IT
t n d ,
δ   allows for time-effects that capture common shocks to all 
countries, and   n η   allows for cross-country fixed-effects. The vector   () η γ β α θ , , , =   of 
common coefficients has  β   as main parameter of interest for evaluation of the IT policy 
regime. For concreteness, we will sometimes refer to     as “average inflation” of 
country  n  in period  t , but a similar reasoning can be applied to other indicators of 
macroeconomic performance like real output growth, inflation volatility and output 
growth volatility. 
t , n y
  Ball and Sheridan (2005) model, denominated BS hereafter, can result from the 
time degeneration of equation (1), which sum up all the data available into  T = 2  
periods, thus turning the  (T-1)-period  dynamic panel (1) into a cross-section: 
 
, ' , , , , , , n e X d y y y post n post n
IT
post n pre n pre n post n ∀ + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = − δ γ β α   (2) 
 
where:     is country’s  n  post-targeting value of average inflation,     is its pre-
targeting value,  
post n y , pre n y ,
( 1 ' − = ) α α   and   ( ) post n n post n e , , υ η + =  . This cross-section setup gives 
  5up the possibility of exploiting the time dimension, and also the cross-country 
unobserved heterogeneity because   n η   cannot be identified from    .
 
post n e ,
2 
  In both equations (1) and (2), a significant  β   relates average inflation to the IT 
policy. For example, a negative significant  β   means that IT countries should have 
lower inflation. However, due to the omission of the time-effect variation   t δ   and the 
country-effect variation   n η  , equation (2) parameters estimates may be biased. 
  As Bertrand et al. (2004) point, to ignore the time series information of the data 
would work well only if all targeters had adopted the regime at the same time. Then, the 
“pre” and “post” time windows would coincide for every country, incorporating exactly 
the same combination of time-effect variation and cancelling out in a between-country 
comparison. But given IT adoption happened at different times for different economies, 
“pre” and “post” are no longer coincident for all IT countries and have to be arbitrarily 
defined for non-ITs. This meaning the time-effect variation   t δ   cannot be ignored in the 
IT analysis. 
  Abstracted the common time-variation problem, BS cross-section regression 
would be useful to investigate between-country variation, which is to ask whether 
targeters have lower inflation. However, equation (2) also ignores country-specific 
factors affecting both inflation dynamics and IT adoption, and may erroneously suggest a 
causal relationship from IT to inflation. To investigate the “within-country” variation, 
which is to ask whether a country is more likely to have a lower inflation in case it adopts 
                                                 
2 In fact, the cross-section equation (2) of BS can result from the time degeneration of two different panel 
models. Besides equation (1), on which we develop this paper, the interpretation given in the BS’s 
Appendix is that equation (2) could result from time-differencing the model: 
 






u n t n y d y ,
1
1 , 1 , , ' ' ' υ η γ β + + − ⋅ + ⋅ = ∑ ∑
−
= = δ +   ,       ( N 1 ) ,  
 
which does include a time-effect,   t ' δ  , and country-effects   n ' η  . However, from time-differenced (N1): 
 
( ) t n t t n
IT
t n t n t n y d y y , 1 1 , , 1 , , ' ' υ δ γ β Δ + + ⋅ − ⋅ = − − − − t ' δ −  , 
 
it is straightforward to see that  () α γ = − 1  ,  ( ) t t t δ δ δ = − −1 ' '   and   ( ) t n n t n , , ' υ η υ + = Δ  , what 
clarifies (N1) is a particular case of (1) that does not identify the country-effect   n η  , the reason why we 
choose (1), like BL and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007). 
  6the IT framework, it is necessary to controls for country-specific unobserved factors 
affecting both inflation and IT adoption. This can partially be accomplished by the use of 
country-effects   n η   in equation (1). Although  n η   does not control for the time variation 
of those country-specific unobserved factors, it removes at least their time-invariant part, 
improving inference on the causal effect. 
  Equation (1) taken as the true model, another concern is that an OLS estimation 
approach is biased and does not establish causation of IT on inflation in either equation 
(2) or (1). The OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent in the highly probable situation 
where  ( ) t n n , υ η +   are related to the regressors    . The covariance   t n w , ( ) n t n y η , cov 1 , −   is 
positive and biases the OLS estimator of  α   upwards. The signs and sizes of the biases 
in the  () γ β,   OLS estimators depend on the combination of  ( ) , , , cov n t n Z η   a n d    
( ) t n t , , ,υ n Z cov   for   ( ) t n,
IT
t n, t n X , d Z = ,  . 
  In equation (1), the fixed-effect OLS estimation is biased if the transformed 




1 , ... 1 −
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1 , − t n y υ
1 , − t n y T
  and   
  are correlated with the transformed error   
 . The correlation between     and     has been 
shown by Nickell (1981) to be negative, because the terms     and  −   in 
  respectively correlate with the terms  




, ... 1 + + − − =
−




, ... 1 υ υ υ υ + + − − =
−
*
1 , − t n y
*
,t n
() 1 − t n y ,
1 −
( ) 1 ,
1 1 −
− − − t n T υ t n, υ n υ   and     in    , resulting 
in a downward biased estimator of  
*
,t
α  , known as the dynamic panel bias problem. The 
biases in the  () γ β,   fixed-effect OLS estimators of (1) depends on the covariances  
( ) j t n t n Z − , , , cov υ 2 ≥ t   for all     and  j = 0, …, (t - 2) . Specifically for the inflation-IT 
relation, because a change in the monetary policy regime seems more probable when 
inflation performance disappoints (is higher than expected), it is not unreasonable the 
suspect that   ( ) 0 , cov , , ≥ − j t n
IT
t n d υ   for  j = 0, …, (t - 2)  . In fact, Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2002 and 2007) show evidence on IT regime being caused by previous inflation. 
This being the case,   ( ) 0 ≥ , cov , , t n
IT
t n d υ  would bias the  β   OLS estimates of (1) and (2) 
upward, and   ( )≥ − j t n
IT
t n d , , , cov υ   for     and  j = 1, …, (t - 2)  would bias OLS  2 ≥ t
  7estimates of (1) downwards. Besides, the reverse causality effect of inflation on IT, there 
is also the reasonable concern that both IT adoption and inflation reduction are caused by 
a third time-varying factor. 
  Thus, for the above listed, we are driven to a Difference GMM estimation strategy 
of equation (1) that controls for simultaneity and omitted variable bias, like Arellano and 
Bond (1991). Under the assumptions of: (i) uncorrelated   t n, υ  and (ii) weakly exogenous 
regressors   ( ) 0 , cov , , = +k t n t n w υ   for     , this approach consists of differencing (1):  1 ≥ k
 
t n t t n t n w y , , , υ δ θ Δ + Δ + Δ ⋅ = Δ ,         ( 3 )  
 
to eliminate the country fixed-effect and to use the following moment conditions on 
instruments    :  s t n w − ,
 







. endogenous   is   if , ..., , 3 , 2





w T t s
w T t s
 
Given   ( ) t n t n t n Z y w , 1 , , , − =  , lags     for instrument     and     for instruments 
  in (4) are indicated because of potential relation with the term 
2 ≥ s s t n y − , 1 ≥ s
s t n Z − , 1 , − t n υ   i n    
( ) 1 , , − − = t n t n , Δ t n υ υ υ  . In case of endogeneity of any    element, its relation with   t n, Z t n, υ  
is handled by using lags    , what makes the instrument     and earlier 
orthogonal to the terms  
2 ≥ s
t ,
2 − ,t n Z
n υ   and   1 , − t n υ   in   t n, υ Δ  . The fact that the regressors are 
“internally” instrumented by their lags is a convenience of Arellano and Bond design, 
which particularly suits this application, where the IT-dummy lacks adequate instruments 
outside the immediate data set.
3  
  Using moment conditions (4), we perform two-step GMM estimation. The first-
step assumes independent and homoskedastic errors across countries and over time. The 
                                                 
3 According to Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), on page 8, footnote 12, some determinants of an IT 
regime, like central bank independence, are not available for time series, while others, such as fiscal 
balance to GDP, were found to be insignificant in their studies. 
  8residuals obtained in the first-step are then used to construct a consistent variance-
covariance matrix for the second-step. However, because  the number of years  is big 
relative to  N , not to risk over-fit the instrumented variables and bias the results, it is 
cautious to hold back the number of instruments. This concern motivates our strategy to 
sum data up over three-year periods, inputting the information contained in a longer time 
series into a smaller number of periods (shrinks  T ), and to collapse the columns of the 
instrument matrix, embodying the moments  [ ] 0 , , = Δ ⋅ − t n s t n w E υ  for all  t  into a single 
moment condition   , as in Calderon et al. (2002). Additionally, we 
apply Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction of the two-step estimator variance-
covariance matrix, which would otherwise result in downward biased standard errors, as 
documented by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 






Δ ⋅ ∑ −
t
t n s t n w E υ
  However, because the IT-dummy variable is a persistent process, its past values 
convey little information about its future changes, and the lagged IT-dummies are weak 
instruments for the differences of the IT-dummy. On the other hand, its last change 
conveys reasonable information about its present value. Thus, to increase efficiency, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest also using the moments: 
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Z T t s
Z T t s
 
where the fixed-effects were expunged from the instruments as indicated in Arellano and 
Bover (1995), and combining these moment conditions (5) with (4) in a denominated 
System-GMM approach. 
  This is appropriate if changes in any instrument     are uncorrelated with the 
fixed-effect,  
t n w , Δ
[ ] 0 , = ⋅ Δ − n s t n w E η   for all  w  and  t . Sufficient conditions for that are: (iii)  
[ ] 0 = 2 , ⋅ Δ n n y E η
t n Z , Δ
  and (iv) that conditional on the common time-effects, the first moments 
of     be time-invariant, which we advocate to be sensible in section 4. In any way, 
  9as these additional moment conditions are over-identifying restrictions, their validity can 
be tested using standard GMM tests of over-identifying restrictions. 
  To test that the assumption that the errors terms are not serially correlated, that the 
instruments are valid ones and that changes in instruments are uncorrelated with the 
fixed-effect, we respectively report three tests. First, we test whether the error term  t n, υ  is 
not serially correlated, which means that   t n, υ Δ   is probably first-order correlated, but not 
second-order correlated. Second, we present the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample 
analog of the moment conditions. And third, the Difference-in-Hansen test for the 
additional moment conditions implied by   [ ] 0 , = ⋅ − n s t n η Δw E  is performed. The failure to 





  This study reexamines GS and BL samples of emerging market economies for the 
period 1980-2006, where evidence of IT effectiveness in lowering inflation and 
macroeconomic volatility were found. As shown in Table 1, the GS sample is composed 
of 36 emerging economies, including 13 IT countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, 
and Thailand. The control group of 23 non-IT countries is composed by: Argentina, 
Bulgaria China, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. The BL sample has the same 
IT treatment group of 13 emerging economies. The difference between the BL and GS 
control groups is that BL do not include Bulgaria, Panama, Singapore and Taiwan, but 
additionally contemplate Algeria, Botswana, Croatia, Ghana, Guatemala, Jordan, Russia, 
Serbia, Tanzania and Ukraine, totaling 42 countries. Aiming at synthesizing the IT effects 
on inflation and output in emerging economies, we choose to present the current analysis 
  10for their union sample of 46 countries and for their intersection sample of 32 economies.
4 
The annual inflation and real GDP growth rates used are from the World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Among the countries studied, 
Croatia, Russia and Ukraine series start in 1993, and Serbia series start in 1998, 
unbalancing the union sample panel. 
 
<Insert Table 1 around here> 
 
  The data is difficult to work, because of cross-country heteroskedasticity, 
exacerbated by the high inflation rates in many countries until the mid-nineties. This fact 
motivated GS to delete inflation rates above 50% per year, arguing this could bias in 
favor of the IT dummy. Given we will be working in time series, this procedure is not 
recommended. BL and IMF (2006) suggest including a threshold dummy for inflation 
rates higher than a certain ceiling as a control variable     in equation (1), an approach 
we take. Additionally to prevent that the results be biased by a small number of countries 
with high inflations, we take the natural logarithm of inflation transforming     into  
t n X ,
t n Y ,
( ) 100 1 ln , , t n t n Y y + = . For methodological consistency, we also log-transform the real 
output growth. 
  Instead of averaging the data in a pre and post periods and working with a cross-
section, we exploit its time and country-specific dimensions, reducing the chances that 
the results be biased by other events happened close before and after IT adoption, or by 
country-specific factors affecting both the indicator of macroeconomic performance and 
the monetary policy regime. Similar to Beck and Levine (2004), the data is summarized 
over many three-year periods, which we believe is a good compromise between removing 
overlapping events and giving enough time for the sluggish responses of macro variables. 
Sensitivity to differences in the definition of the three-year periods and time span is also 
addressed by presenting results for the years from 1985 to 2005. 
                                                 
4 Results for GS and BL samples of countries can be provided upon request. As an overlook, BL results are 
closer to the union sample results, while GS results are closer to the intersection sample results. 
  11  The existing literature diverges on when to date the adoption of IT, if with the 
start of a partial inflation targeting (for example, Corbo, Landerretche and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2002); Gonçalves and Salles (2006)), or only when full-fledged targeting is at 
work (Mishkin (2000); Batini and Laxton (2007); IMF (2006)), as illustrated with GS and 
BL adoption dates in Table 1.A. Although some robustness exercises with GS IT dating 
are presented, most of this article works with BL IT adoption dates, a choice we buttress 
on Mishkin’s (2000) point that to be classified as an IT economy, in addition to a public 
announcement of numerical targets for the future inflation, elements like institutional 





  Tables 2 to 6 present estimates of equation: 
 
t n n t t n
IT
t n t n t n high d y y , , , 1 , , υ η δ γ β α + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = − ,      (1’) 
 
resulting from various estimation methods, for different measures     o f  
macroeconomic performances, where    is a dummy variable equal to  1  if average 
inflation is bigger than  0.40  per year (in natural logarithm) in period  t  a n d   0  
otherwise.
t n y ,
t n high ,
5 
  The indicator of performance     is the average inflation in Tables 2.A and 4.A 
and the average real output growth in Tables 2.B and 4.B. Tables 3 and 5 show estimates 
of equation (1’) when     is the volatility of inflation in panels A or the volatility of real 
output growth in panels B, both measured as the standard-deviation in three-year periods. 
It seems sensible to keep the dummy variable for high inflation     in the equations 
of output growth and volatilities of inflation and output growth, given the many possible 
y
y
t n high ,
                                                 
5 Results without the     can be provided upon request and are not qualitatively different with 
respect to the IT regime effect. 
t n high ,
  12macroeconomic interrelations. For     equal to the coefficient of variation of inflation 
and output growth, calculated as the difference between the standard deviation and the 
absolute value of the average, Table 6 displays estimates of a simpler version of equation 
(1’) without the variable    . 
y
t n high ,
t
 
<Insert Table 2 around here> 
 
  The column 1 of Tables 2 and 3 present estimates of the simple pooled cross-
section OLS, that omits  δ   and   n η  , with robust standard-errors clustered by country. 
Although estimated in a multi-period setting, instead of in a cross-section setting like BL 
and GS, these estimates pretty much reproduce their findings that the IT regime is 
effective to reduce average inflation (in Table 2.A), the volatility of inflation (in Table 
3.A) and the volatility of output growth (in Table 3.B), without a significant cost in terms 
of lower real output growth (in Table 2.B). The     variable is also significant for all 
four measures, indicating that in high inflation periods, there is less growth (in Table 2.B) 
and more macroeconomic volatility (in Table 3). 
t n high ,
  However, the inclusion of the time-effect variation   t δ   in column 2 (TE-OLS) of 
Tables 2 and 3 considerably modifies the results. Now, the negative impact of IT on 
inflation (in 2.A) has a negative significant side-effect on output growth (in 2.B), 
meaning that IT countries grow less. At the same time, the relation between the IT 
dummy and the volatilities of inflation and output growth are not significant anymore. 
These results indicate that BL and GS abstraction of the differences in the time span of 
countries’ pre and post experiences somehow overstated the negative relation between 
the IT regime and inflation levels or macroeconomic volatility. The inclusion of the 
common time effect corrects such distortion, weakening these relations and, more 
revealing, suggests that inflation targeters do pay a cost in terms of reduced economic 
growth for pursuing lower inflation. 
 
<Insert Table 3 around here> 
 
  13  In column 3 of Tables 2 and 3, we present results for the fixed-effect OLS, with 
both   t δ   and   n η   included (CTE-OLS) and robust standard-errors clustered by country. 
As explained in section 2, the fixed effect OLS estimator of  α   is biased downward 
because of the negative correlation between the transformed variables     and    , 
something noticeable when comparing the lagged variable coefficients in this column 
with the ones in column 2. The bias in  
*
1 , − t n y
*
,t n υ
β   depends on the opposite effects of   
( ) t n, cov υ
IT
t n d , ,  and   ( ) j t n
IT
t n d − , , , cov υ   for all    and  j = 1, …, (t - 2) , being difficult to 
predict. However, because  
2 ≥ t
( ) t n
IT
t n d , , ,υ cov   also affects the TE-OLS estimator, but   
( ) j t n − , cov υ
IT
t n d , ,   for  j = 1, …, (t - 2) only affects the CTE-OLS estimator, given the 
estimate of  β   in column 3 of Table 2.A is much smaller than the one in column 2, it is 
possible to infer that  ( ) 0 ≥ j , cov , , − t n
IT
t n d υ  for  j = 1, …, (t - 2)  for the average inflation 
equation. A similar, but milder, pattern holds for the volatility of inflation in Table 3.A 
and validates the intuition that IT is positively related to past inflation disappointment. 
For real output growth, there are no significant changes in the estimates from columns 2 
to 3 in Table 2.B and 3.B. These support the reasonable suspicion that IT adoption was 
mainly driven by inflation concerns and not by output growth concerns. 
 
<Insert Table 4 around here> 
 
  In columns 4 of Tables 2 and 3, we use the two-step Difference-GMM estimator 
to fix the dynamic panel bias and to take into account the indisputable endogeneity of  
 , but keep on treating     as predetermined. For periods    , we use the 
instruments  
t n high ,
IT
t n, d 3 ≥ t
( ) j
IT
j t n j t n d y − − − − − − 2 1 , 2 , , , t n high ,   for  j = 0, 1, …, t-3 . Given our sample of only 
46 countries (N  is small), we have to collapse the columns of the instruments matrix to 
be able explore the information contained in the deeper lags of the regressors while 
holding back the number of instruments to avoid the over-fit problem.
6 The four 
measures of economic performance adjust pretty well to the proposed parameterization 
                                                 
6 Here for example, by collapsing the columns of the instrument matrix, like Calderon et al. (2002), we sum 
up the information of an otherwise 66 rank instrument matrix into a 23 rank instrument matrix. 
  14(1’). In accordance with the assumptions, there is some evidence of first-order 
autocorrelation of the residuals, no evidence of second-order autocorrelation, and the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions does not reject the overall validity of the 
instruments. Given the TE_LS and CTE_LS estimators of  α   are likely to be biased in 
opposite directions, the fact that all estimates of  α   in column 4 lie between their 
equivalents in columns 2 and 3 is another evidence of consistency. But in spite of the 
good model adjustment, its results are disappointing about the effectiveness of the IT 
policy. The IT coefficient is close to zero and insignificant for the average inflation 
equation, and becomes positive but insignificant for the measures of average growth and 
volatilities of inflation and growth. 
  Given the high persistence of the IT variable, the imprecisely estimated 
coefficients in column 4 seem a symptom of the past levels of IT being a weak instrument 
for its present changes. In such situation, Blundell and Bond’s (1998) System-GMM is the 
suitable estimation approach, provided the condition that changes in any instrument are 
uncorrelated with the fixed-effects. Sufficient conditions for that are: (iii)   
[ ] 0 2 , = ⋅ Δ n n y E η
t n Z , Δ
  and, (iv) that conditional on the time-effects, the first moments of   
  be time-invariant. 
  Because there is nothing special about the first observation in our samples, we 
might expect the initial condition   [ ] 0 2 , = ⋅ Δ n n y E η  to be valid.
7 It is thus sufficient that, 
conditional on time-effects,  [ ] 0 , = ⋅ n t n η ΔZ E  , which is clearly weaker than requiring the 
levels of     be uncorrelated with the country effects. Specifically in the inflation-IT 
relation, this impose that the IT adoption be unrelated to the country’s inflation fixed-
effect 
t n Z ,
[ ] 0 = n E η , ⋅ Δ
IT
t n d , but allows the IT regime and the country’s inflation fixed-effect 
to have a time-invariant relation,   [ ] c d E n
IT
t n = ⋅η ,  for all  t , where   0 ≠ c   is a constant, as 
                                                 
7 Our sample starts in 1980 because this is the first year reported for most of emerging economies. For 
robustness purposes, we also report results for a sample that starts in 1985. 
  15well as the IT adoption to be related to inflation changes  [ ] 0 , , ≠ Δ ⋅ Δ t n
IT




8 A similar 
reasoning applies to    .  t n high ,
  The column 5 in Tables 2 and 3 show the two-step System GMM estimates and 
specification tests, treating     as endogenous and     as predetermined. For 
periods    , we use the instruments  
t n high ,
3 ≥ t ( ) j t n high − −2 ,
IT
j t n j t n d y − − − − 1 , 2 , , ,   for  j = 0, 1, …, t-3 
with the equation in differences, and the instruments  ( ) 1 , , 1 , , , − − Δ Δ t n
IT
t n t n high d Δy   with the 
equations in levels. Like in column 4, there is evidence of first-order autocorrelation and 
no evidence of second-order autocorrelation. The Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions does not reject the overall validity of the instruments and the estimates of  α   
lie between the TE-OLS and CTE-OLS. Additionally, the Difference-in-Hansen does not 
reject the validity of the additional moment conditions  [ ] 0 , = ⋅ Δ n t n w η E . Relative to the 
Difference-GMM, the IT dummy coefficients become negative and more significant. 
Although more negative, the impact of IT on inflation (in 2.A) is less significant than its 
turn down effect on real output growth (in 2.B), indicating that IT does have some cost in 
terms of lower output growth. The relation between the IT dummy and the volatility of 
inflation is negative but insignificant, while the volatility of output growth shows a 
negative significant relation with the IT regime. 
  Next in column 6, we deal with the possible endogeneity of the IT regime. 
Although the time- and country-effects are useful in removing the influence of the cross-
country invariant and time-invariant determinants of both macroeconomic performance 
and monetary policy regime, those may not be enough to address the causality of IT on 
macroeconomic performance. Perhaps, there is also a reverse causality from inflation, 
and/or output growth to IT. Or there may be a third omitted country-specific time-
variable factor that determines both the macroeconomic performance and the monetary 
policy regime. To handle the consequent endogeneity of IT in such circumstances, we re-
estimate column 5 with IT as an endogenous variable instead. This is implemented by 
                                                 
8 Although theoretical work on IT regime recommends that some pre-conditions be fulfilled for IT adoption 
, which would imply  [ ] 0 , ≠ ⋅ Δ n
IT
t n d E η , IMF (2006) shows that those were not previously accomplished 
by emerging economies that become inflation targeters, meaning   [ ] 0 , = ⋅ Δ n
IT
t n d E η   at least in this 
respect. 
  16lagging the   instrument once more. Thus, for periods    , we use the instruments  
IT
t n d , 3 ≥ t
( ) j t n n j t n high d y − − − − 2 , 2 , ,
IT
j t − −2 , ,   for  j = 0, 1, …, t-3 with the equation in differences, and 
the instruments  ( ) 1 , 1, − − Δ t n t high , 1 , , − Δ Δ
IT
n t n d y   with the equations in levels. 
  The estimates in columns 6 of Tables 2 and 3 have as good adjustment as the ones 
in column 5. However, the new β   estimates uncover the simultaneity existent between 
average inflation and IT regime. In Table 2.A, the IT coefficient becomes more negative 
and significant relative to column 5, indicating that IT is positively influenced by the 
average inflation error,   ( ) 0 , , > t
IT
n d , n t υ cov . The β   estimates of output growth (in 2.B), 
inflation volatility (in 3.A) and volatility of output growth (in 3.B) do not change much, 
clarifying that the main cause of endogeneity bias is the reverse causality from inflation 
levels to IT. 
  Analyzing column 6 estimates deeper, the long-term average difference in 
inflation between IT and non-IT countries is  -3.71  percent per year (in natural 
logarithm) in Table 2.A, similar to GS value for the period 1980-2005.
9 The long-run 
reduction in the volatilities of inflation and output growth, respectively  -0.22  and  -0.46  
percent, can be considered small and, in the volatility of growth case, different from the  -
1.4  percent got by GS. However, there is a considerable long-term output growth cost of   
-1.18  percent to be borne for the IT use. 
  So far, assuming that IT adoption is not related to the country-fixed effects, we 
have the evidence that IT framework is effective to reduce inflation levels, with small 
impacts on volatilities, at the cost of lower output growth. But are these findings for the 
period 1980-2006 in an unbalanced panel of 46 countries with BL IT adoption dates 
robust? Tables 4 and 5 present some robustness checks by examining the period 1985-
2005 in columns 1 and 2, the use of GS IT adoption dates in columns 3 and 4 and the 
balanced panel of 32 countries which intersect BL and GS samples in columns 5 and 6. 
 
                                                 
9 For equation (2) during the period 1980-2005, GS report in their Table 2 estimates of  α’ = - 0.67  and  β 
= - 2.53 , resulting in long-term average difference in inflation between IT and non-IT countries of  -3.78  
percent, or  -3.71  percent in natural logarithm. Given methodological and sample differences with the 
current work described above, such similarity should be partially attributed to simple coincidence. Results 
for other periods still close, but not this equal. 
  17<Insert Table 5 around here> 
 
  In column 1 and 2 of Table 4.A, we again see strong evidence of IT endogeneity 
in the inflation-IT relation. For the period 1985-2005, the IT regime is effective to reduce 
the level of inflation at the cost of lower economic growth, respectively in column 2 of 
Tables 4.A and 4.B. Output growth volatility repeats in column 2 of Table 5.B the same 
insignificant small sensitivity to IT presented in column 6 of Table 3.B. The change in 
pattern, relative to the period 1980-2006, happens to inflation volatility that now seems 
significantly reduced by the IT framework. 
  The use of GS IT adoption date in columns 3 and 4 results in a pattern very close 
to the one reported in columns 5 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3, indicating that the results are 
not sensitive to differences in the IT dating. However, the variation in the non-control 
group in columns 5 and 6 considerably change the results. When the sample studied is the 
balanced panel of 32 countries common to BL and GS, the absolute size of the IT effect 
on the inflation levels is much reduced and its significance annulled. While IT does not 
seem to significantly affect inflation levels anymore, neither the volatilities of inflation 
and output growth in column 6 of Table 5, it is still causing a significant negative effect 
on output growth in column 6 of Table 4.B 
  Summarizing Tables 4 and 5, the negative side effect of IT regime on average 
output growth seems more robust than its intended minimization effects on average 
inflation, inflation volatility and output volatility. 
 
<Insert Table 6 around here> 
 
  To finish, because IT has shown to cut down average measures, it is reasonable to 
wonder whether its negative effects on volatility measures are not due to the standard-
deviation being linearly related to the absolute size of the mean. Table 6 tries to address 
this estimating equation (1’) without the     dummy variable for the coefficients of 
variation of inflation (in 6.A) and output growth (in 6.B), computed as the difference 
between the standard-deviation and the absolute average. Columns 1 to 6 show two-step 
System GMM estimates for three different samples: the union sample during 1980-2006 
t n high ,
  18(in columns 1 and 2), the union sample during 1985-2005, and the intersection sample 
during 1980-2006. For all samples, reasonably adjusted according to the specification test 
results, the estimates of the IT impact become positive in general and non-significant, 
demonstrating that the apparent damping down effect of IT on volatilities of inflation and 





  In this paper, we examined the impact of the IT framework on the level and 
volatility of emerging countries’ inflation and output growth. Different from Batini and 
Laxton (2007) and Gonçalves and Salles (2008), which used Ball and Sheridan’s (2005) 
cross-section difference-in-difference OLS, we applied the dynamic panel estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) that controls for 
simultaneity and omitted variable biases. This instrumental variable estimation better suit 
the inference purpose on the causal effect of IT on inflation and resulted in considerable 
qualifications Batini and Laxton (2007) and Gonçalves and Salles (2008) conclusions. 
  The inclusion of a common time-effect variation weakened the cross-country 
negative relation of the IT regime with average inflation and measures of volatility, and 
uncovered a strong negative relation between the IT framework and economic growth. 
  After controlling for the dynamic panel bias problem and for the endogeneity of 
the IT regime, there is some evidence that IT reduces inflation, but it is not robust to 
variations in the non-IT control group. The IT impact on the volatilities of inflation and 
output were shown small and their significance variable to subtle changes in the 
instrument set, period of analysis, IT adoption date or non-IT control group. Among the 
macroeconomic indicators of performance studied, the most robust result was that the IT 
regime significantly hinders output growth. 
  In sum, although there is some relation between IT and lower inflation, this 
relation seems weaker than previously affirmed in the literature. More important, in 
opposition to the previous views that IT adoption was costless in term of output growth, 
  19we showed that there is a negative significant relation between IT adoption and output 
growth to be taken into account for purposes of evaluation of the IT policy. 
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Table 1    
Authors' Samples and Dates of Inflation Targeting Adoption 
    
1.A - Inflation targeting countries 
Year of inflation targeting adoption, according to: 
present in both samples: 
Gonçalves and Salles (2008)  Batini and Laxton (2006) 
Brazil 1999  1999 
Chile 1991 1999 
Colombia 2000  1999 
Czech Republic  1998  1998 
Hungary 2001  2001 
Israel 1992  1997 
Mexico 1999  2002 
Peru 1994 2002 
Philippines 2002  2002 
Poland 1999  1999 
South Africa  2000  2000 
South Korea  1998  1998 
Thailand 2000  2000 
    
1.B - Non-inflation targeting countries present in: 
both samples:  Gonçalves and Salles only:  Batini and Laxton only: 
Argentina Bulgaria  Algeria 
China Panama  Botswana 
Costa Rica  Singapore  Croatia 
Côte d’Ivoire  Taiwan  Ghana 
Dominican Republic    Guatemala 
Ecuador   Jordan 
Egypt   Russia 
El Salvador    Serbia 
India   Tanzania 
Indonesia   Ukraine 
Lebanon    
Malaysia    
Morocco    
Nigeria    
Pakistan    
Tunisia    
Turkey    
Uruguay    
Venezuela       
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Table 2         
Estimates of the Inflation Targeting Effects on Inflation and Output Growth (1980-2006) 
        
Estimator:  OLS  TE-OLS  CTE-OLS  D-GMM P  S-GMM P  S-GMM E 
Regressors:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2.A - CPI Inflation Equation 
Inflation-targeting  -3.73 -1.74  -10.90  -0.10 -1.86 -3.18 
dummy  (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.99) (0.08) (0.01) 
Lagged inflation  0.23 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.14 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.23) (0.30) (0.28) 
High inflation dummy  72.70 69.00 71.10 72.00 73.70 76.50 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(1) test      0.07  0.07  0.07 
AR(2) test      0.87  0.90  0.90 
Hansen J test      0.26  0.27  0.48 
Difference-in-Hansen       0.49  0.91 
Observations  350 350 350 304 350 350 
Instrument columns      23  27  26 
R-squared  0.59  0.60  0.51          
2.B - Real Output Growth Equation 
Inflation-targeting  -0.26 -0.60 -0.28 3.35 -0.85 -1.01 
dummy  (0.43) (0.02) (0.70) (0.33) (0.02) (0.02) 
Lagged output growth  0.14 0.16 -0.02 0.12 0.14 0.15 
  (0.30) (0.27) (0.85) (0.52) (0.41) (0.40) 
High inflation dummy  -3.97 -3.85 -4.25 -1.77 -2.26 -2.17 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.44) (0.18) (0.20) 
AR(1) test      0.14  0.08  0.08 
AR(2) test      0.25  0.26  0.27 
Hansen J test      0.57  0.26  0.21 
Difference-in-Hansen       0.23  0.23 
Observations  350 350 350 304 350 350 
Instrument columns      23  27  26 
R-squared  0.15 0.20 0.18       
Pooled cross-section (OLS) in column (1), including time-variable effect (TE-OLS) in (2), and time and 
country-effects (CTE-OLS) in (3), with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. (4) uses two-
step difference GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991) (D-GMM P). (5) and (6) use  two-step system GMM of 
Arellano and Bover (1995). (5) takes the IT dummy as predetermined (S-GMM P), while (6) assumes it is 
endogenous (S-GMM E). D-GMM and S-GMM report Windmeijer's (2005) corrected robust standard errors. All 
columns use Batini and Laxton (2006) IT dating. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 46 emerging countries 
(all countries in Table 1) with data averaged over 3-year periods between 1980 and 2006. The start date of the 
dependent variable is 1985 (i.e.: t=1985 and t-1=1982). AR(1), AR(2), Hansen J tests and Difference-in-Hansen 
report the respective p-values. 
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Table 3         
Estimates of the Inflation Targeting Effect on Macroeconomic Volatility (1980-2006) 
        
Estimator:  OLS  TE-OLS  CTE-OLS  D-GMM P  S-GMM P  S-GMM E 
Regressors:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
3.A - Inflation Volatility Equation 
Inflation-targeting  -1.35 -0.60 -1.86 8.42 -0.26 -0.19 
dummy  (0.01) (0.26) (0.25) (0.19) (0.51) (0.70) 
Lagged inflation  0.19 0.20 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.15 
volatility  (0.02) (0.02) (0.27) (0.20) (0.03) (0.03) 
High inflation dummy  28.90 27.50 28.50 35.30 32.20 32.30 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(1) test      0.05  0.04  0.04 
AR(2) test      0.52  0.46  0.47 
Hansen J test      0.12  0.34  0.29 
Difference-in-Hansen       0.23  0.25 
Observations  350 350 350 304 350 350 
Instrument columns      23  27  26 
R-squared  0.41  0.42  0.35          
3.B - Real Output Growth Volatility Equation 
Inflation-targeting  -0.75 -0.30 0.01  1.50 -0.37 -0.34 
dummy  (0.01) (0.34) (0.98) (0.74) (0.05) (0.24) 
Lagged output growth  0.29 0.30 0.12 0.23 0.27 0.27 
volatility  (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
High inflation dummy  3.34 3.05 3.10 1.17 1.43 1.39 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.38) (0.14) (0.16) 
AR(1) test      0.03  0.02  0.02 
AR(2) test      0.42  0.44  0.44 
Hansen J test      0.83  0.86  0.84 
Difference-in-Hansen       0.70  0.70 
Observations  350 350 350 304 350 350 
Instrument columns      23  27  26 
R-squared  0.23 0.25 0.15       
Pooled cross-section (OLS) in column (1), including time-variable effect (TE-OLS) in (2), and time and 
country-effects (CTE-OLS) in (3), with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. (4) uses two-
step difference GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991) (D-GMM P). (5) and (6) use  two-step system GMM of 
Arellano and Bover (1995). (5) takes the IT dummy as predetermined (S-GMM P), while (6) assumes it is 
endogenous (S-GMM E). D-GMM and S-GMM report Windmeijer's (2005) corrected robust standard errors. All 
columns use Batini and Laxton (2006) IT dating. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 46 emerging countries 
(all countries in Table 1) with data averaged over 3-year periods between 1980 and 2006. The start date of the 
dependent variable is 1985 (i.e.: t=1985 and t-1=1982). AR(1), AR(2), Hansen J tests and Difference-in-Hansen 
report the respective p-values. 
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Table 4        
System GMM Estimates of the Inflation Targeting Effects on Average Inflation and Average 
Real Output Growth: Robustness Checks             
        
  Union sample  Intersection sample 
Author's IT (period):  BL (1985-2005)  GS (1980-2006)  BL (1980-2006) 
Estimator:  S-GMM P  S-GMM E  S-GMM P  S-GMM E  S-GMM P  S-GMM E 
Regressors:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
4.A - CPI Inflation Equation 
Inflation-targeting  -0.97 -4.35 -1.76 -3.14 -1.68 -1.09 
dummy  (0.41) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.24) (0.65) 
Lagged inflation  0.18 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.21 
  (0.21) (0.29) (0.28) (0.24) (0.09) (0.10) 
High inflation dummy  62.60 77.30 72.30 70.80  102.00  102.00 
  (0.32) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(1) test  0.48 0.38 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
AR(2) test  0.83 0.98 0.82 0.83 0.64 0.62 
Hansen J test  0.12 0.27 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.11 
Difference-in-Hansen  0.02 0.06 0.62 0.77 0.13 0.01 
Observations  266 266 350 350 256 256 
Instrument columns  21 20 29 28 27 26 
4.B - Real Output Growth Equation 
Inflation-targeting  -1.19 -1.13 -0.86 -1.20 -0.81 -1.05 
dummy  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.04) 
Lagged output growth  -0.11 -0.09 0.11  0.12 -0.04 -0.04 
  (0.63) (0.70) (0.49) (0.47) (0.76) (0.80) 
High inflation dummy  -7.35 -6.85 -2.40 -2.68 -2.03 -1.84 
  (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.06) (0.18) (0.27) 
AR(1) test  0.17 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.20 0.21 
AR(2) test  0.83 0.89 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.21 
Hansen J test  0.17 0.17 0.28 0.25 0.29 0.21 
Difference-in-Hansen  0.06 0.10 0.41 0.32 0.35 0.17 
Observations  266 266 350 350 256 256 
Instrument columns  21 20 29 28 27 26 
Columns (1) to (4) use the unbalanced panel of 46 countries. (1) and (2) cover the period 1985-2005 with Batini 
and Laxton (2006) IT dating, and (3) and (4) cover the period 1980-2006 with Gonçalves and Salles (2008) IT 
dating. Columns (5) and (6) use the balanced panel of 32 emerging countries (countries in the first column of 
Table 1) during 1980-2006. Data are averaged over 3-year periods. S-GMM P and S-GMM E are two-step 
system GMMs of Arellano and Bover (1995), with Windmeijer's (2005) corrected robust standard errors, where 
S-GMM P takes the IT dummy as predetermined, and S-GMM E assumes it is endogenous.  AR(1), AR(2), 
Hansen J tests and Difference-in-Hansen report the respective p-values. 
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Table 5        
System GMM Estimates of the Inflation Targeting Effects on Inflation Volatility and Real 
Output Growth Volatility: Robustness Check             
        
  Union sample  Intersection sample 
Author's IT (period):  BL (1985-2005)  GS (1980-2006)  BL (1980-2006) 
Estimator:  S-GMM P  S-GMM E  S-GMM P  S-GMM E  S-GMM P  S-GMM E 
Regressors:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
5.A - Inflation Volatility Equation 
Inflation-targeting  -0.76 -1.10 -0.54 -0.79 -0.79 -0.40 
dummy  (0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.23) (0.65) 
Lagged inflation  0.14 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.28 0.27 
volatility  (0.26) (0.26) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
High inflation dummy  36.20 40.30 32.50 32.60 29.70 29.50 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(1) test  0.14 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
AR(2) test  0.18 0.16 0.46 0.46 0.94 0.96 
Hansen J test  0.68 0.76 0.46 0.43 0.23 0.22 
Difference-in-Hansen  0.49 0.68 0.30 0.27 0.02 0.04 
Observations  263 263 350 350 256 256 
Instrument columns  21 20 29 28 27 26 
5.B - Real Output Growth Volatility Equation 
Inflation-targeting  -0.64 -0.32 -0.39 -0.26 -0.63 -0.53 
dummy  (0.01) (0.24) (0.05) (0.35) (0.01) (0.38) 
Lagged output growth  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29 
volatility  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
High inflation dummy  0.40 0.52 1.02 0.96 1.18 1.06 
  (0.71) (0.58) (0.28) (0.32) (0.25) (0.32) 
AR(1) test  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
AR(2) test  0.41 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 
Hansen J test  0.69 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.92 0.86 
Difference-in-Hansen  0.20 0.37 0.22 0.24 0.74 0.71 
Observations  262 262 350 350 256 256 
Instrument columns  21 20 29 28 27 26 
Columns (1) to (4) use the unbalanced panel of 46 countries. (1) and (2) cover the period 1985-2005 with Batini 
and Laxton (2006) IT dating, and (3) and (4) cover the period 1980-2006 with Gonçalves and Salles (2008) IT 
dating. Columns (5) and (6) use the balanced panel of 32 emerging countries (countries in the first column of 
Table 1) during 1980-2006. Data are averaged over 3-year periods. S-GMM P and S-GMM E are two-step 
system GMMs of Arellano and Bover (1995), with Windmeijer's (2005) corrected robust standard errors, where 
S-GMM P takes the IT dummy as predetermined, and S-GMM E assumes it is endogenous.  AR(1), AR(2), 
Hansen J tests and Difference-in-Hansen report the respective p-values. 
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Table 6        
System GMM Estimates of the Inflation Targeting Effects on Inflation Coefficient of Variation 
and Real Output Growth Coefficient of Variation: Robustness Check       
        
  Union sample  Intersection sample 
Period: 1980-2006  1985-2005  1980-2006 
Estimator:  S-GMM P  S-GMM E  S-GMM P  S-GMM E  S-GMM P  S-GMM E 
Regressors:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
6.A - Inflation Coefficient of Variation Equation 
Inflation-targeting  0.88 1.52 1.02 1.16 0.09 -1.42 
dummy  (0.21) (0.08) (0.14) (0.44) (0.92) (0.48) 
Lagged inflation  0.44 0.45 0.49 0.47 0.56 0.56 
coefficient of variation  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(1) test  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
AR(2) test  0.65 0.65 0.12 0.12 0.61 0.59 
Hansen J test  0.22 0.22 0.41 0.54 0.12 0.06 
Difference-in-Hansen  0.66 0.79 0.22 0.47 0.70 0.04 
Observations  350 350 263 263 256 256 
Instrument columns  19 18 15 14 19 18 
6.B - Real Output Growth Coefficient of Variation Equation 
Inflation-targeting  0.39 0.65 0.22 0.46 -0.02 0.40 
dummy  (0.25) (0.11) (0.65) (0.43) (0.97) (0.50) 
Lagged output growth  0.25 0.25 0.11 0.13 0.23 0.23 
coefficient of variation  (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(1) test  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test  0.38 0.38 0.44 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Hansen J test  0.80 0.70 0.46 0.42 0.59 0.49 
Difference-in-Hansen  0.67 0.60 0.22 0.31 0.15 0.14 
Observations  350 350 262 262 256 256 
Instrument columns  19 18 15 14 19 18 
Columns 1 to 4 use the unbalanced panel of 46 countries. (1) and (2) cover the period 1980-2006, and (3) and 
(4) cover the period 1985-2005. Columns 5 and 6 use the balanced panel of 32 emerging countries (countries in 
the first column of Table 1) during 1980-2006. All columns use Batini and Laxton (2006) IT dating. Data are 
averaged over 3-year periods. S-GMM P and S-GMM E are two-step system GMMs of Arellano and Bover 
(1995), with Windmeijer's (2005) corrected robust standard errors, where S-GMM P takes the IT dummy as 
predetermined, and S-GMM E assumes it is endogenous.  AR(1), AR(2), Hansen J tests and Difference-in-
Hansen report the respective p-values. 
 